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In this paper I argue that an approach to liberalism that combines an anti-
foundationalist epistemology and a deliberative democratic stance enables us to alleviate the 
tensions between the universalistic claims of human rights and the particularistic claims to 
autonomy coming from different cultural groups, which are exacerbating as a consequence 
of the processes of global integration and fragmentation.  
Before being able to appreciate the force of my argument we need, however, to show 
the viability of anti-foundationalist liberalism and the virtuous relationship between anti-
foundationalism and deliberative democratic liberalism. I will deal first with the viability issue 
by giving a sketch of what I consider to be the most plausible conception of normativity, and 
defending it from the criticisms of epistemological and political viability. Turning then to the 
desirability issues, I will describe the main traits of the political outlook which I favour, 
deliberative liberal democracy, and highlight its strict relationship with anti-foundationalism. 
We will thus be able to understand why I maintain that an anti-foundationalist deliberative 
democratic approach to liberalism can help us accommodating the growing cultural clashes 
and in particular the tensions between universal human rights and cultural diversity. 
 
 




I believe that we can find the most plausible anti-foundationalist epistemology in 
the conception of normativity and rationality emerging form the works of the neo-
pragmatists philosophers who in the last thirty-odd years have best developed the anti-
metaphysical and anti-sceptical arguments first elaborated by the founding fathers of 
American pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey, and by the 
second Ludwig Wittgenstein, namely Donald Davidson, Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam 
and Richard Bernstein.
1
I see this anti-foundationalist conception of normative authority as centred on the 
distinction between universal grounds for and universal scope of normativity. It 
maintains that the universalistic normative force of our norms and practices remains 
uncompromised by the acknowledgment of the ultimate circularity of our justifications, 
thus eschewing the pitfalls of both foundationalism and relativism. 
The starting point of this position is the claim of the grammatical impossibility of 
the metaphysical project to reach ‘the point of view from nowhere’
2. Namely, the 
impossibility of the foundationalist project of metaphysics is considered to be inherent to 
the very concept of reality towards which it aims in its search for certainty. The epistemic 
assurance which metaphysics has always sought would consist in fact in a reality that, by 
definition, is placed beyond our cognitive reach, for it is supposed to be a reality beyond and 
independent of our particular beliefs and values. Hence, it is the very foundationalist 
conception of the justificatory ground for our practices and cognitive faculties the source of 
the radical scepticism, in its relativist and idealist forms, which corrodes normativity and cuts 
off its links to the external world.  
                                                 
1See for instance D. Davidson: Inquires into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984); R. Rorty: 
Objectivity, Relativism and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); H. Putnam: Realism with a Human 
Face (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); R. Bernstein: Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1983). 
2.T.Nagel: The View from Nowhere. (New York ;Oxford :Oxford University Press,1986) 
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The result of the rejection of the metaphysical epistemological framework is a 
volitional
3 conception of knowledge and rationality that avoids the dangers of radical 
scepticism by placing the source of normative authority in that same dimension of practice, 
laden with our values, needs and interests, which foundationalists attempt to transcend. This 
is a conception of normativity that acknowledges that our principles and practices ultimately 
rest on some ungrounded set of fundamental – yet not foundational – beliefs and values, 
without considering this as an impediment to the exercise of our reflective and critical 
faculties, to the formation of more or less precise ideas of what is right and wrong, better 
and worse in any circumstance of our lives.  
Hence, the fact that we have no universal ground for our particular moral and 
political views and practices – e.g. no transcendent conception of human nature or moral 
law to justify universally our conceptions of human rights and justice – does not mean that 
we cannot hold those views and practices to be universally valid, i.e. that they cannot or 
should not be held to apply universally. Human rights claims, as any moral claim, are indeed 
universal, but their universality is culturally grounded, not metaphysical. They are universal 
in scope not in ground. This is the truth in universalism.  
The other side of the epistemic coin of normativity is the truth in relativism. The 
truth in cultural relativism is not the corrosive claim that we cannot criticize another point of 
view or tradition or regard anything to be true or right any longer, but only the recognition 
that the chain of our justifications must end somewhere, on some contingent set of values 
and beliefs that cannot non-vacuously be said to be either true or false, right or wrong, since 
they are our very criteria of truth and right. Yet, they are criteria of truth and right. 
Critics of such a cultural universalistic epistemological position at this point usually 
turn from the charge of relativism to that of ethnocentrism. With this charge they intend to 
accuse anti-foundationalism of legitimising the imposition of one culture or point of view 
over another, and of opening the door for any kind of oppressive and imperialistic conducts, 
and thus of intensifying cultural conflict, as anyone would feel legitimated to impose his or 
her own view of justice, the good and human rights. 
This ethnocentric critique, however, misses the central point made by anti-
foundationalism. It is in fact a moral and political criticism, while the ethnocentric dimension 
                                                 
3By calling the anti-foundationalist conception of knowledge volitional I mean to call attention to its recognition 
of the central role played by our values in the process of acquiring knowledge. 
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pointed out by anti-foundationalism is exclusively epistemological. Again, it amounts to the 
serene acceptance that the petitio-principi is our epistemic condition; to the consideration that, 
as Richard Rorty puts it, ‘ideals may be local and culture-bound, and nevertheless be the best 
hope of the species.’
4 But this epistemological truth in ethnocentrism has no moral and 
political lesson attached to it, let alone an illiberal one. The distinction that needs to be 
grasped here is between epistemic legitimacy and moral legitimacy. The former does not entail 
the latter. 
Of course, to say that anti-foundationalism is morally and politically neutral is also to 
deny that it entails or coincides with liberal principles and practices of human rights. Yet, the 
question I want to address in this paper is not ‘why should an anti-foundationalist care about 
human rights or multiculturalism?’, or in fact ‘why should anyone respect human rights and 
cultural diversity at all?’, but the less demanding one ‘why should anti-foundationalism matter 
to a liberal and multicultural society?’ While there are no conclusive reasons why anti-
foundationalists, and indeed anyone, should abide by liberal democratic principles and 
practices rather than behaving in oppressive ways, I believe that there are good reasons to 
believe that the fuller realization of the liberal project would be facilitated by the spreading 
of anti-foundationalist awareness. Before turning to consider the desirability of anti-
foundationalism from a liberal point of view it is necessary however to outline briefly my 





Deliberative Democratic Liberalism 
 
 
The liberal tradition cannot be considered the expression of a clearly defined project 
characterized by a precise and unquestioned set of values, beliefs, norms and institutions and 
their interpretations and applications. There has always been disagreement amongst 
supporters of liberalism on the defining characteristics of its political and moral project, on 
                                                 
4R.Rorty: ‘On Ethnocentrism’, in Objectivism, Relativism, and Truth. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press,1991), p.208. 
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the content and relative priority of its central values of freedom and equality as well as on 
the form of the practices and institutions that should implement them. 
My particular reading of liberalism is centred on the appreciation of the equal dignity 
of all human beings, and on a conception of human dignity centred on people’s capability to 
conduct an autonomous life. I take personal autonomy not in its negative meaning as the 
absence of external constraints to one’s freedom of choice and action, but in the positive 
sense of being as much as possible in control of the circumstances affecting one’s own life. 
This appreciation of personal autonomy as a fundamental human right leads us directly to 
the deliberative democratic principle that only those norms and practices can be deemed 
morally and politically legitimate which are the result of a free and fair process of public 
decision-making that includes all who will bear the consequences of their implementation.
5
Of course, the problem faced by any such a procedural conception of democratic 
decision-making is that in order to start deliberating on issues of common interests people 
should come first to an agreement on the terms and rules of deliberation, on the criteria of 
‘free’ and ‘fair’ conditions of public discourse as well as on the boundary of the political 
demos. However, these being issues of public interest, they should be resolved exactly 
through those very free, fair and inclusive procedures of collective deliberation that 
guarantee everyone’s autonomy and that yet are the very object of dispute. 
The solution to this regressus ad infinitum of democratic deliberation, just as for the 
similar epistemic infinite regression of justification, is to start moving in circle, that is to say, 
to shift from theoria to praxis, to get down to our everyday practices. If we are lucky these 
practices will be shared, and we could draw on them to extract a list of uncontested 
procedural rules. Yet agreement, at least permanent agreement, just like universal truth, is 
                                                 
5I hasten to make clear that this principle is not grounded, as for Habermas and Apel, on a transcendental 
argument from the pragmatic presuppositions of rational argumentation, but rather it rests on the fundamental, 
ethnocentric, moral conviction that everyone should have the right to contribute on an equal footing to shape 
those collective decisions that will affect her or his life. Briefly stated, the problem with any transcendental 
justification such as Habermas’s and Apel’s is that it is unavoidably circular. It would work only if it could 
demonstrate that communicative action is the universal and inescapable presupposition of any kind of action we 
may be involved in; that is, that whatever we might do we are always already engaged in acts of mutual 
understanding guided by the deliberative democratic principle (Habermas’s rule of discourse U). If we can 
resort to alternative forms of social behaviour to that of communicative action, then, it does not matter how 
much the principles of a democratic and pluralist ethics of conversation are ingrained in such communicative 
practices, no analysis of their structures and pragmatic presuppositions could ever show us that we should 
recognize the obligation to commit ourselves to the ethics of deliberative democratic liberalism on pain of 
performative contradiction. According to anti-foundationalist deliberative democrats, non-liberals sin against 
people’s right to autonomy, not against Reason. 
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not for human beings. The practices by means of which we will try to solve the 
constitutional impasse of establishing the procedural rules and constitutional limits of 
collective deliberation, will soon or later exclude someone, if they are not already exclusive, 
and will be questioned. 
This consideration takes us to what I regard as the crucial condition for a genuine 
deliberative democracy, and thus for a genuine liberal society which respects everyone’s 
autonomy, in a plural world. A society that wants to be faithful to the dictates of freedom, 
equality and human dignity should not only give equal consideration to the voices of all 
those affected by public decisions, but should also be ready to open to public discussion and 
revision its outcomes as well as its most fundamentals assumptions, the conditions of 
political membership, the content of its constitutional rights, its procedural rules and their 
practical and institutional implementations.
6
The main idea behind the self-reflexive character of public deliberation that I am  
endorsing is that, no matter what our particular positions on the moral and political outlook 
and institutions of a just society are, if we do not want to risk sliding into a more oppressive 
and unjust society than one we could feasibly live in, if we do not want to risk that legitimate 
claims to freedom, equality and fundamental rights are left unheard, unacknowledged and 
unsatisfied, we must keep open the debate over the fundamentals of liberalism itself, over 
the correct interpretation and application of the values of freedom, equality and human 
rights. We must avoid conceiving of the particular practices and institutions of our society as 
just sub specie aeternitatis, and thus immune from revision. God himself, or its representatives, 
so to speak, if they cared about the fundamental human right to live an autonomous life, 
would sit at the all-inclusive and self-reflexive table of free and fair public conversation and 
deliberation. 
                                                 
6Amy Gutmann and Daniel Thompson have advanced a similar conception of deliberative democracy in 
Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1996). See also Seyla 
Benhabib: ‘Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy’, in Democracy and Difference, S.Benhabib ed. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Joshua Cohen: ‘Procedure and Substance in Deliberative 
Democracy’, in Democracy and Difference; Iris Marion Young: ‘Communication and the Other: Beyond 
Deliberative Democracy’, in Democracy and Difference. Seyla Benhabib has recently re-stated the importance for 
democracy of keeping the public debate open with regard to the terms and conditions of democratic 
membership by elaborating the concept of ‘democratic iterations’. See The Rights of Others (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press: 2004).  
Incidentally, the centrality of self-reflexivity for liberal democracy entails that the debates over the guiding 
values and institutional assets of a liberal society, as well as those over the very criteria for ‘free’ and ‘equal’ 
terms of collective deliberation and for democratic membership, must be considered as a vital part of the liberal 
democratic tradition itself. 
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It is by reflecting on this ‘priority of democracy over philosophy’, to use Rorty’s 
description of John Rawls’s political conception of justice,
7 that we can start to unravel the 







Anti-foundationalism and Deliberative Democracy 
 
 
To say that respect for human beings’ autonomy should take precedence over 
correspondence to a reality beyond human beings means in fact to say that, even if 
foundationalism would be a feasible project, even if someone were to discover how things 
really are or should be, a thorough endorsement of liberalism would urge us not to bend to 
the dictates of the successful foundationalist. In a genuine liberal culture, metaphysics, even 
if it were a feasible project, would not be the foundation of culture, because in a deliberative 
democratic culture there would not be any privileged authoritative and unquestionable voice. 
This means that anti-foundationalism is desirable for liberal democracy as it enables the 
fuller realization of the ideal of equal respect for the dignity of every human being.  
It is not that anti-foundationalism coincides with liberalism. As I have already noted, 
there is nothing incoherent in being anti-foundationalist and conservative, intolerant and 
totalitarian. None the less, anti-foundationalism is particularly suited for a liberal democratic 
culture because by denying that any particular practice has an absolute privileged authority 
over all the others, and reminding us of the contingency of our convictions and practices 
and that every consensus reached is only a temporary resting-point prone to turn into 
oppressive status-quo, it exhorts liberals to keep the outcomes and procedures of collective 
deliberation open to dissent and change; it facilitates the realization of the liberal anti-
                                                 
7R.Rorty: ‘The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy’, in Objectivism, Relativism, and Truth. See J. Rawls: Political 
Liberalism, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993). 
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authoritarian and egalitarian ideal of removing all the obstacles to the free questioning of 
received opinions and institutions and to a fair consideration of all points of view.  
Foundationalism, instead, with its idea that there is a particular point of view that 
ought to be given absolute authority because of its correspondence with the metaphysical 
order of things compromises the realization of free and fair conditions of inquiry and 
conversation; it closes the conversation, even the conversation within liberalism itself, thus 
betraying what I have claimed to be the central value of a genuine liberal society, namely the 
permanent openness of self-reflexive collective deliberation. 
Certainly, even the concrete liberal practices and principles that anti-foundationalists 
may endorse, no matter how close to the deliberative democratic ideal they might be, will 
always manifest some degree of conservativeness and exclusiveness. But still, anti-
foundationalist awareness, as opposed to a foundationalist one, will not be a priori against 
possible reforms of the particular set of liberal principles and practices endorsed, even if it 
might not be able to ensure them or to make them any easier. 
In the idea that no foundational consideration should take precedence over the 
result of all-inclusive and self-reflexive collective deliberation we find another important 
point of convergence between deliberative democratic liberalism and an anti-foundationalist 
conception of normativity. To believe that, as Benjamin Barber has put it, the condition of 
democratic politics consists in ‘the necessity for public action in the presence of conflict and 
in the absence of private or independent grounds for judgment’,
8 means, in fact, not only to 
confirm the anti-foundationalist anti-relativist claim that our practices swing free from 
metaphysical foundations, that metaphysical issues are irrelevant to the working of our 
practices, but also, – and most importantly – to endorse the same view of political and moral 
conflict as that depicted by anti-foundationalism. 
An anti-foundationalist conception of normativity enables us to acknowledge how 
the problems emerging from our encounters with the outside world are of a practical, moral 
and political nature, and not of an ontological or epistemological order. In particular, it 
makes us acknowledge that the problems deriving from the plurality and opposition of 
points of view, traditions, needs and interests do not appeal to our cognitive faculty to break 
the ‘veil of appearance’ and look at how things really are and should be, but to our moral and 
                                                 
8B. Barber: Strong Democracy. (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1984), p.180: 
my emphasis.  
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political sensitivity and commitment. It helps us understand that the problems raising from 
the diversity and incompatibility of human beings are not problems from which to run away 
finding repair in the solitude of philosophical reflection orientated to the discovery of the 
right way to live together, but must be taken for what they are: a diversity and an 
incompatibility of fundamental values, interests and beliefs for which the only solutions are 
the concrete moral and political concrete proposal that each one of us regards as most 
appropriate.  
We can thus say that anti-foundationalism is beneficial for liberalism, not only 
because bringing the source of normative authority back to people’s individual assent 
eliminates the epistemological obstacles to the realization of the anti-authoritarian and 
egalitarian liberal project, but also because bringing to the fore the political and moral nature 
of the problems that pluralism and multiculturalism poses to us helps us appreciate that a 
democratic resolution of multicultural conflicts calls for conversation with our fellow human 
beings and not for confrontation with a reality beyond humanity. 
It is this combined recognition of the volitional – as opposed to cognitive – nature 
of cultural and political conflicts, and of self-reflexive and all-inclusive collective deliberation 
as the only acceptable means to manage them, that enables anti-foundationalist deliberative 
democracy to alleviate the tensions between cultural and individual particularism and the 
universality of human rights. It is now time to turn to the main contention of this paper and 






The Desirability of Anti-foundationalist Deliberative Democratic Liberalism  
 
 
Let us start by asking ourselves what do the conflicts between universal human rights 
and cultural and individual diversity amount to? 
From an anti-foundationalist perspective we are able to appreciate how any such 
conflict is not an epistemological conflict between universally and culturally or individually 
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valid principles and practices, nor is it an ontological opposition between individual and 
collective rights, but it ultimately turns out to be a clash between different moral outlooks 
and political projects, different culturally situated universalistic conceptions of human rights, 
the common good and the requirement of justice. They are conflicts between fundamental 
values, beliefs and interests for which, as I said, the only solutions are the concrete 
institutional and policy proposal that each one regards as most appropriate from her or his 
moral and political perspective. From a deliberative democratic perspective these conflicts, 
as any social conflict, will have to be solved by means of practices of public confrontation 
and deliberation that both include every person who has a stake on the issues in question 
and keep their outcomes and their fundamental assumptions open to questioning and 
reform. 
In particular, such a non-cognitive approach to conflict resolution committed to the 
equal respect and concern for everyone’s autonomy, whether it is applied to conflicts within 
a multicultural state or in the international arena, enables us to bypass two main obstacles in 
the way of a peaceful and reasonable resolution of cultural conflicts. These are at the same 
time the two opposed, yet similar, epistemological positions that keep swinging the 
pendulum between universalism and cultural relativism. I am referring to the universalists’ 
appeal to foundational authority – be it in the form of the Will of God, the Essential Nature 
of Human Beings, or the Force of Reason – and the no less essentialist appeal of the 
relativists to cultural authority – the authority of the Ethnos, intended as a homogeneous and 
static whole, a natural object. 
The rhetoric of moral necessity and cultural tradition are two important factors 
behind the exacerbation of cultural conflicts as well as behind most violations of liberal 
principles and internationally recognized human rights. The universalist rhetoric is behind 
most of the imperialist and oppressive practices that human history has witnessed and is 
continuing to witness. The cultural relativist rhetoric is behind most of the violation of 
human rights that – alas! – are undertaken under the liberal and multicultural banner of the 
collective rights to self-determination and cultural diversity. 
From a liberal perspective committed to inclusive and self-critical practices of 
collective deliberation as means of conflict resolution, and opposed to any foundationalist 
conception of normative authority as well as to any essentialist conception of culture, when 
faced with the question of which set of conflicting practices and principles should be given 
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priority, within a state or in the international arena, we will ask which are most representative 
and respectful of the autonomous will of the people who will bear their consequences, and 
not which correspond to the noumenal or cultural truth.  
The ontological conflict between collective and individual rights will also dissolve as 
these two kind of right-claims will come to be seen as two different but complementary 
expressions of the same overarching commitment to people’s autonomy. The 
implementation of deliberative democratic procedures of resolution of normative conflicts 
will in fact enable us both to avoid what Will Kymlicka calls ‘internal restrictions’ – i.e. 
restrictions to the claim of a group against its own members –  and to guarantee what he 
calls ‘external protections’ –  i.e. protections of the claim of a group against the larger 
society.
9 Every group and individual will thus be left as free to shape and pursue its cultural 
and political practices as these are consistent with the equal right to autonomy of other 
individuals and cultural groups.  
This commitment to people’s autonomy through the exercise of the civic virtue of 
deliberative democratic means of conflict-resolution will surely not dissolve or guarantee any 
easy solution to political and cultural conflicts, especially as these conflicts will reappear 
around the question of what are the essential conditions for the exercise of an autonomous 
life, and whose autonomy should be given priority. Yet, it will contribute to alleviating them 
by avoiding the deaf and oppressive imposition of cultural practices over dissenting groups 
and individuals. Of course, this would be the case only if everyone would commit her/himself 
to deliberative democratic civic virtue. It is, indeed, liberals’ crucial problem how to deal with 
those who reject deliberative democratic procedures of collective decision-making.  
This is Plato’s old problem of how to respond to Thrasymachus, how to respond to 
the moral and political villain. It is the problem of how tolerant liberals should be towards 
the intolerant and the intolerable, towards non-liberals. This central question of political 
philosophy has been modulated in contemporary political practice and theory in terms of 
both the conditions for a just war or a just interference with state sovereignty and the extent 
to which a liberal multicultural state should be multicultural, i.e. permit and tolerate 
particular cultural and individual practices.  
                                                 
9W.Kymlicka: Multicultural Citizenship, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995): see in particular pp.34-48 and 
152-172. Antifoundationalist deliberative democracy will indeed subordinate the choice of restrictions policies 
within a community and within a multicultural state to self-reflexive practices of collective deliberation 
involving all those who have at stake in the policies in question. 
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There is no rule of thumb that can provide specific answers to these political and 
moral dilemmas in every particular circumstance. The concrete policies that liberals should 
endorse to deal with illiberal states, communities and individuals will have to be hammered 
out case by case, taking into consideration issues of feasibility and convenience as well as 
questions of justice. And, of course, the choice of the particular course of action to endorse 
will have to be submitted to free and open procedures of collective decision-making, 
involving as far as possible everyone who has a stake in the decision, non-liberals included.  
It is beyond the reach of this paper to elaborate in detail the deliberative democratic 
view of just war and of the limits of multicultural tolerance. However, I will sketch some 
guiding principles for dealing with these hard cases in the context of illustrating my thesis 
that an anti-foundationalist and deliberative democratic approach to liberal politics enables 
us to bypass what I said to be two main obstacles in the way of a peaceful and reasonable 
resolution of cultural conflict by breaking free of the universalism-relativism dualism. 
To give strength to my argument, then, let us briefly consider both the case of the 
cultural relativist’s appeal to the right of self-determination to justify departure from 
internationally recognized human rights standards, and the case of the universalist’s appeal to 
the moral law to justify interference with state sovereignty and the autonomy of individuals 
and cultural groups, and see how they would be addressed from an anti-foundationalist 
deliberative democratic approach to liberalism and human rights. 
From such a perspective who justifies a set of polices and practices referring to the 
authority of cultural tradition will be asked to show that these genuinely respect the freedom 
and equality of every person affected by them. She or he will be asked to show us that the 
culture of the community, whose right to non-interference is being defended even from the 
interference of who demands the implementation of liberal rights and principles, is truly 
representative of all its members. The idea is that a community is autonomous if and only if 
its members are autonomous. In this way we shall be able to establish the real intentions 
hiding behind the appeals to cultural relativism as a defence of the principles of state 
sovereignty and self-determination. 
In particular, we shall be able to establish whether what is being defended is really 
the autonomy of a people or rather a repressive regime whose practices have nothing to do 
with the would-be indigenous culture which has been appealed to as a justificatory ground. 
We will be able to establish, for example, whether those practices are only the expression of 
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the vested interests of a ruling elite who, as Adamantia Pollis puts it, ‘exploits the language of 
cultural relativism to justify and rationalise its repressive actions’
10 or if, in a similar way, as 
Karen Miller has illustrated in a study on Iranian women’s rights, ‘in rejecting the aspirational 
character of universalism, relativism merely perpetuates traditional practice’
11, protecting 
them from possible criticisms and revisions. 
If any of these circumstances would turn out to be the case there would be no 
principled reason preventing liberals from intervening in the internal affairs of a state or a 
community, even if the standards of moral and political legitimacy to which they would 
resort to justify their intervention – e.g. the International Bill of Rights – cannot be justified 
in a non-circular way. As I said, the particular measures of interference will have to be 
hammered out case by case, by hunch and compromise, without the guidance of absolute 
criteria but only of our particular and contingent points of view.  
The fundamental principle that should guide deliberative democrats in their 
elaboration of concrete policies of intervention in the internal affairs of oppressive states 
and communities will, of course, be that of giving priority to inclusive and self-reflexive 
discursive means of conflict resolution and collective decision-making over violent, 
exclusivist or dogmatic ones. This will entail as a corollary the commitment to do as much as 
possible to involve and empower the oppressed and dissident sectors of those states and 
community, and to use force only as a last resort; and then only on the basis of a thorough 
and transparent consideration of the gravity of the human rights violations perpetrated, with 
the utmost concern to protect civil society and punish only the oppressor, and with the 
exclusive aim of restoring genuine self-determination.  
These, of course, are very general indications, which must be supplemented by 
pragmatic considerations of convenience and feasibility. Yet they enable us to appreciate 
how the anti-foundationalist deliberative democratic approach to intra-state and inter-state 
multicultural conflict is centred on the commitment to empower individuals and 
communities through the fostering of an autonomous civil society from the local to the 
global, and, accordingly, to subordinate the implementation of international human rights 
standards and constitutional fundamentals to the autonomous acceptance and interpretation 
                                                 
10A.Pollis: ‘Cultural Relativism Revisited: Through a State Prism’, in Human Rights Quarterly, 18/2 (1996) p.319. 
11K.Miller: ‘Human Rights of Women in Iran: The Universalist Approach and the Relativist Response’, at 
http://www.law.emory.edu/EILR/volumes/win96/miller.html 
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of the different communities as far as this is consistent with the equal autonomy of other 
individuals and communities.
12
I hasten to make clear that I am not affirming that deliberative democrats cannot 
criticise any particular cultural practice that, no matter how illiberal it might be by our 
human rights standards, is the expression of the autonomous will of its participants. From 
their own moral and political perspective they would surely be obliged not to interfere 
violently with it. Yet nothing prevents them from engaging with the allegedly illiberal culture 
in rational debate. We must keep rational criticism separate from forceful interference. Rational 
confrontation, i.e. exchange of reasons and criticism, is after all one of the fundamental 
organising principles of a liberal society committed to deliberative means of conflicts 
resolution. It is indeed regarded by liberals as one of the main engines of social progress and 
social cohesion. 
We must insist again, against foundationalist supporters of liberalism, that to 
acknowledge the impossibility to establish the universal validity of liberal principles and 
human rights does not entail depriving them of their universal normativity. We must insist 
that to acknowledge our ethnocentric epistemic condition does not deprive us of the rational 
defences, let alone the forceful ones, against what we consider as threats to our most 
cherished values and practices. Nor does it make our support of these practices and values, 
using Richard Wilson’s critical expression, ‘a car without belts that at the first moral obstacle 
puts the passenger’s safety at risk.’
13 It only makes us realize that, as Rorty has remarked, 
 
there is no way to beat totalitarians in argument by appealing to shared common 
premises, and no point in pretending that a common human nature makes the 
totalitarians unconsciously hold such premises.14
 
That is, it makes us realize, pace Plato, arguing against the tyrant does not require 
arguing against relativism, that the tyrant is not sinning against Reason but only against our 
liberal principles, and that, again with Rorty, ‘abandoning Western rationalism has no 
                                                 
12Karen Miller in the article above quoted puts forth a similar position in developing what she calls ‘the grass 
roots method’ of solving the counterproductive tensions between universalism and relativism. 
13R.Wilson, ed.: Human Rights, Culture and Context. (London: Pluto Press, 1997) p.8  
14R.Rorty: ‘Science as Solidarity’, in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, p.42.  
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discouraging political implications. It leaves the Enlightenment political project as good as 
ever.’
15
Indeed, such an ethnocentric awareness, just as it can help us uncover the relativist 
rhetoric of oppressive regimes and ruling classes, it can also help us divest conservative and 
imperialist policies of their rhetoric of absolute truth, be it used in good or bad faith. By 
depriving imperialists and oppressive actors of the possibility to justify in a credible way 
their policies and practices in the foundational terms of moral obligation, we shall be wary of 
any attempt at interfering with the autonomy of individuals and communities that is not 
carried out in respect of the principle of autonomy itself and does not follow the deliberative 
democratic priorities and recommendations I sketched above. 
Furthermore, emptying the epistemological credibility of the fundamentalist and 
manipulative uses of the discourses of universal human rights and liberal democracy, and 
bringing back political and moral decisions to the arena of public reasoning where they 
belong, is vital in order to restore or win people’s trust in the liberal project as I have 
described it. In particular, it enables us to save the valuable principles expressed in the body 
of international human rights treaties and conventions and in liberal-democratic 
constitutions from the discredit that has been brought on them by those who appeal to 
them as a smokescreen for the pursuit of personal interests or justification of expansionist 
policies, as well as by those who, unwilling to abide by those principles, strategically use in 
justification of illiberal practices the criticism that can only be made of hypocrite liberalism or 
liberal fundamentalism: namely, the criticism that, as Sami Aldeeb puts it, in reality ‘human 
rights are used as a political instrument and not at all as a guarantee for the respect of human 
rights.’
16 The point I want to raise has been well made by Bartolomeo Conti when he 
observes that  
 
it is unlikely that the universality of human rights will be able to show its [moral] power 
amongst the third world cultures [indeed any culture] as long as they will remain an integral 
part of a strategy of political, economical and cultural control of the West, used as an excuse 
to intervene in and interfere with other countries.17
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n.17, pp.58-59.  
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I have argued for the viability and desirability of a political and moral position that 
combines an anti-foundationalist conception of normativity and a deliberative democratic 
reading of liberalism centred on the principle of all-inclusive and self-reflexive procedures of 
collective deliberation. As for the viability issue, I have illustrated how anti-foundationalism 
does not entail either corrosive relativism or vicious ethnocentrism. The argument for the 
desirability of anti-foundationalist liberalism has brought us to appreciate how such an 
approach enables us to accommodate cultural conflicts in accordance with the equal respect 
and concern for everyone’s autonomy. 
In particular, anti-foundationalist deliberative democratic liberalism can help us 
release the tensions between conflicting normative claims by depriving of epistemic and 
political authority the appeals to moral law and cultural tradition that so often have 
contributed to exacerbating cultural conflicts. It also offers us guidance in taking a decision 
on the question of which among conflicting social practices should be dropped and which 
should be given priority, by placing, as far as it is pragmatically possible, respect for 
individual and collective autonomy above any other concern, and promoting those practices 
and institutional settings that foster the exercise of people’s right to be master of their own 
life. It can help us, that is, to achieve, in the words of Susan Moller Okin, ‘a form of 
multiculturalism that gives the issue of intra-group [and inter-group] inequalities their due – 
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that is to say, a multiculturalism that effectively treats all persons as each other’s moral 
equals’.
18  
Furthermore, anti-foundationalist liberalism can play a crucial role in restoring 
people’s trust in, and strengthening people’s commitment to, the ethics and politics of 
human rights and multiculturalism by saving them from the discredit into which they have 
been thrown by the often manipulative use of the rhetoric of moral necessity and cultural 
tradition to justify imperialist policies and oppressive regimes. It can accomplish this by 
bringing the crucial questions affecting people’s lives, included the interpretation and 
application of human rights, back into the arena of free and open public confrontation and 
deliberation. Indeed, as Anne Phillips has correctly observed,  
 
we always need the maximum possible dialogue to counter the false universalisms that have 
so dogged previous practice, as well as the ‘substitutionism’ that has allowed certain groups 
to present themselves as spokespersons for the rest.19  
  
Anti-foundationalist deliberative democracy thus empowers people by placing the 
interpretation and implementation of universal human rights into the hands of all human 
beings, rather than the disenfranchising hands of God, Nature, Reason, Culture or, in fact, 
the ruling class of the day which hides behind them. Anti-foundationalist deliberative 
democracy will surely not extinguish cultural and political conflicts, yet it represents our best 
hope for civilising them, for replacing violent and deaf confrontation with peaceful and 
fruitful conversation across differences. 
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